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AMENDING THE OVERSIGHT: LEGISLATIVE· 
DRAFTING AND· THE CABLE ACT 
MICHAEL I. MEYERSON· 
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("Cable 
Act") I heralded a new age for the law and regulation of cable 
television. The Cable Act represented· the first comprehensive 
federal law governing the no-longer new ·com·munications tech-
nology of cable television. After years of confronting a "patch-
work" of federal, state; arid local regulation, the cable industry, 
government regulators, and the public were told that the Cable 
Act would create a "natiomil policy concerning cable communi-
cations,"2 and firmly "establish guidelines for the exercise of 
Federal, State, and local authority."3 
/ Unfortunately, the Cable Act has failed to fulfill its numerous 
objectives. Advertised as a careful balance, the Cable Act has 
been administratively and judicially converted to a lopsided grant 
of victory to the cable industry. ProClaimed a harbinger of clar-
ity: the Cable Act has led to frequent litigation over· the meaning 
of its most basic terms. 
This result is due to a perhaps not unusual combination of 
legislative factors. First, despite the elongated negotiation pro-
cess, the final version of the bill was hurried through the end of a 
long congressional term. Second, Congress entrusted the Fed-
. eral Communi~ations Commission ("FCC" or "the Commis-
sion") to carry out its mandate of compromise, only to have both 
the FCC and the reviewing courts igriore the language and spirit 
of the Cable Act.4 Finally, in constructing the delicate balance of 
the Cable Act, the legislative drafters listened to too few voices. 
The primary negotiators were representatives of the cable indus-
try and the cities; no other input was permitted until the bill was 
in almost final form, and numerous gaps in the law were permit-
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore. B.A. Hampshire College, 
1976; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1979. 
I Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-'549, 98 Stat. 2779 
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. V 1987». Since the legislative history and 
proposed amendments use the numbering of sections from the original law as passed, 
this Article will also use that numbering in the text. Footnotes will provide both section 
numbers. 
2 Cable Act, § 601(1), 47 U.S.C. § 521(1). 
3 Id. at § 601(3), 47 U.S.C. at § 521(3): 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 70-93. 
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ted to remain. 5 
There have "been extensive congressional discussions over 
the flaws of the Cable Act.6 Due to this "legislative oversight," 
substantial amendment is likely. While basic policy issues, such 
as the continuance of rate deregulation and the problems of ver-
tiql integration, have occupied most of the discussions of the 
Cable Act, many areas of cable policy have received only scant 
attention. This Article examines some of the important, yet gen-
erally overlooked, problems created by the Cable Act. The Arti-
cle also proposes amendments to permit the Cable Act to fulfill 
its original lofty promise. 
I. AMBIGUITY AND OTHER DISEASES OF LANGUAGE' . 
All legislation starts with the serious drawback of being com-
posed of words. The inability of language to create certainty of 
understanding is a long-acknowledged reality: "A word is not a 
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to 
the circumstances and the time in which it is used."8 And as Jus-
tice Felix Frankfurter explained, this difficulty in interpretation is 
many times greater for complex statutes, "If individual words are 
inexact symbols with shifting variables, their configuration can 
hardly achieve invariant meaning or assured definiteness .... A 
statute is an instrument .of government partaking of its practical 
purposes but also its infirmities and limitations, of its awkward 
and groping efforts."9 
The Cable Act, however, has more than its fair share of 
"awkward and groping efforts." Needless confusion has been 
created by the failure to define fundamental terms. Avoidable 
litigation has been caused by other definitions that speak with 
more ambiguity than clarity. Still other critical areas of the Cable 
Act are permeated by unelucidating sounds of silence. 
One of the cardinal rules of legislative drafting is to never 
use the same word to convey more than one concept. Repeating 
" See infra text accompanying notes 94-96. 
·6 See Oversight oj Cable TV Hearings before the Subcomm. on Communications oj the Senate 
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and TrallSportation, S. Hrg. 101-464 IOIth Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1989) [hereinafter Oversight oj Cable TV]; Competitive Issues in the Cable Television Industry 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights oj the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary , S.Hrg. 100-818, 100th Congo 2d Sess. (1989). 
7 See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES 43-
53 (1975) [hereinafter THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES]. 
R Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes,J.). 
!I Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading oj Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 
(1947). 
1990] LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING AND THE CABLE ACT 235 
a word to express different meanings, so-called ,"utraquistic sub-
terfuge,"IO will inevitably lead to confusion by violating the logi-
cal presumption that, within a single statute or document,· the 
same word, will refer to the same idea. 
The Cable Act manages to use the word "service" (or "serv-
ices") to convey at least four mutually exclusive thoughts. For 
example, the Cable Act requires certain cable operators to pro-
vide channels for the commercial use of unaffiliated parties, II and 
has provisions to prevent cable operators from circumventing 
this requirement. Section 612(c)(3) states that these channels, 
"shall not be used to provide a cable service ... if the provision 
of such programming is intended to avoid the purpose of this 
section." The "services" in this subsection unmistakably mean 
"programming." 12 
The Cable Act defines "cable service," though, more 
broadly, as "the one-way transmission of ... video program-
ming, or ... other programming service, and ... subscriber in-
teraction, if any, ... required for the selection of such video 
programming or other programming service."I!! This definition 
of "cable service" was meant to draw the boundary between that 
which could not be governed by common carrier regulation and 
"non-cable services" whose regulation the Cable Act was not 
designed to preempt. 14 Accordingly, "cable services" includes 
not only video programming, but pay-per-view, the one-way 
transmission of computer games, and one-way videotext. 15 Non-
cable services include shopping and banking at home, electronic 
mail, and video-conferencing. 16 
The distinction between "services" meaning only video pro-
gramming and "cable service" meaning video programming and 
the provision of one-way information technology was ignored by 
the FCC in its proceedings on rate deregulation. The Cable Act 
specified that such deregulation was to occur except where the 
FCC found that a "cable system [was] not subject to effective 
10 R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAITING 62 (1954) [hereinafler LEGISLATIVE 
DRAITING]. 
I I For a discussion of thee failure of section 612 to create a workable system for leased 
access, see infra text accompanying notes 112·19. 
12 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE, 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4684 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT 934] (referring to "in-
crease in the sources of programming"). 
13 Cable Act, §§ 602(5)(A), (5)(8),47 U.S.C. §§ 522(5)(A), (5)(8). 
14 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 41·42. 
15 [d. at 44. 
16 [d. 
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competition."17 In its rulemaking, the FCC quoted the directive 
from the House Report: "In determining whether [a] cable sys-
tem is subject to effective competition ... the FCC should con-
si!1er the number and nature of services provided, compared with the 
number and nature of services available from alternative sources 
and, if so, at what price."18 In defining "effective competition," 
the Commission only" considered competition for video program-
ming, but not other forms of "il1formation services." Perhaps 
that analysis is that which Congress intended. Perhaps alllegisla-
tive thought on rate-making concerned rates charged for video 
programming. If so, more precise language should have been 
used in ·the ·legislation .. 
A still different definition of "services" must be discerned 
for section 625(e), which explicitly bars the ope"rator from ob-
taining court-ordered .modification of "any requirement for serv-
ices relating to· public,' 'educational, or governmental access."19 
"Services" cannot possibly mean "programming" for this provi-
sion because the cable operator does not supply' programming 
for public, educational or governmental access. In fact, the cable 
operator is statutorily prohibited froIl1 exercising any editorial 
control over the programming that is shown on the access chan-
nels.20 Thus, there cannot be any requirement imposed on the 
cable operator for programming "relating to pllblic, educational, 
or governmental access." . 
Although the .phrase "access services" is not defined in the 
Cable Act, it may be possible to define "access services" by ascer-
taining what those services do not include. The section on modi-
fication does refer to 'access . requirements other than "access 
services." The cable operator is permitted to obtain modification 
of "facilities or equipment, including public, educati9.nal, or gov-
ernmental access facilities or equipment, "21 upon proof of com-
mercial impracticability .. This provision, unfortunately, merely 
further c~mfuses the reader. A perusal of the Cable Act reveals 
17 Cable Act, § 623(b)(I), 47 U.S.C. § 543(b)(I). For a discussion of the FCC's deci-
sion making process re'garding this standard, see infra notes 87-93 and accompanying 
text. 
I H Implementing the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 
48,765,48,770 (1985) (quoting HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 66). ' 
I!l Cable Act, § 625(e) (emphasis added), 47 U.S.C. § 545(e) (emphasis added). 
20 Cable Act, § 611(e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(e). 
21 Cable Act, § 625(a)(I)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 545(a)(I)(A). "Facilities or equipment" 
seems to refer primarily to hardware and physical structure. "Commercial impracticabil-
ity" is given the same meaning as in the Uniform Cpmmercial Code. See HOUSE REPORT 
934, supra note 12, at 71 (referring to u.C.C. § 2.-615 comment 8 (1978)). . 
" .. 
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not only that "services" does not always mean "s'ervices," but 
that "facilities" are only a subset of "facilities." 
In a fascinating, though far 'from unique, example of self-
reference, "the, definitional section of the Cable Act actually de-
fines "public, educational, or governmental access facilities" to 
mean both "channel capacity designated for [access}" and facilities and 
equipment for'the use 'of such channel capacity."22 Thus, when 
speaking of access, '''facilities and equipment" means "facilities" 
minus "channel capacity."23 Though it 'may seem gratuitous, it 
should probably be pointed out that the phrase that is defined in 
the "Definitions" section, "public, educational, or governmental 
access facilities;" does not appear by itself anywhere in the Cable 
Act except in the definitional section - only the subterm "access 
facilities or equipment" appears. 
Because (1) "access fa~ilities and equipment"does not in-
clude "channel capacity," and (2) the only, referenc~ to access 
other than .to "facilities and equipment" in tl:Ie modification sec-
tion is to access "services," it may be assumed that (3) "services" 
in this subsection encompasses 'the channel capacity set aside for 
access. To the rather obvious question of why the term "channel 
capacity" was not used, it could be argued that "services" was 
meant to also include all other non-hardware requirements such 
as staffing, 'promotion; and funding of access centers.24 
A final meaning for "service" can be found in section 
626(c)(I)(B), permitting denial of franchise renewal for "the 
quality of the opera~or'sservice." "Service" here seems to en-
compass notions of "consumer protection."25 The Cable Act 
states that "operator's service" means "signal quality, response 
to consumer complaints, and billing practices" but not "cable 
22 Cable Act. § 602(13). 47 U.S.C. § 522(13) (emphasis added). There also appears 
to be no significance between the conjunctive "facilities and equipment" used in the 
definitional section and disjunctive "facilities or equipment" used in the modification 
section. The House Report. in describing the modification section. utilizes the conjunc-
tive phrase as well: "[T]he cable operator may obtain modification of a requirement for 
facilities and equipment .... " HOUSE REPORT 934. supra note 12. at 71 (emphasis 
added). 
.' , 
23 Apparently. this statutory distinction was not appreciated by those who wrote the 
House Report. since. in a discussion of the facilities and equipment that could be re-
quired,in a franchise., it is stated that "[f]acility and equipment requirements may in-
clude requirements which relate to channel capacity .... " HOUSE REPORT 934. supra 
note 12. at 68. " 
'24 See Meyerson. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the Coax-
ial Wires. 19 GA. L. REV. 543. 578 (1985). 
25 See Cable Act § 632. 47 U.S.C. § 552. which is titled "Consumer protection" and 
refers to enforcement of "customer service requirements." [d. at § 623(I)(a). 47 U.S.C. 
§,543(1)(a). 
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services. "26 
There is absolutely no excuse for requiring those trying to 
understand a statute to work so hard to ascertain different mean-
ings for the same word. Such confusion should be avoided 
through amending the language of the Cable Act. The word 
"services" should be used to mean programming or information 
provided to subscribers over the cable system. To describe vide-
otext, on-line airline guides and the like, the term "information 
services," used in section 624(b)(I),27 should replace the phrase 
"programming service" that was used in the definitional section 
602(5). When programming - video, audio or both - is meant, 
that word should be used. For the prohibition on modification of 
access "services," the phrase "channel capacity, funding and 
other requirements for access other than facilities and equip-
ment" should be substituted. For the renewal section, "customer 
service" could be used instead of "operator's service." 
The ambiguity of the word "service" leads to another area of 
confusion. The Cable Act preempts local regulation of "rates for 
the provision of cable service."28 The Cable Act does not define, 
however, the words "rates" and "provision." If "cable service" 
is video and other programming, plus the interaction "required" 
for the selection of the programming,29 what about other aspects 
of cable technology? One court ruled that, despite rate deregula-
tion, a state may prohibit a cable operator from charging sub-
scribers who live in sparsely populated rural areas an additional 
fee for "contributions in aid of construction."30 This ruling was 
based on the concern that charging different subscribers differ-
ent fees would conflict with Congress's "emphasis on encourag-
ing equal access to cable television."31 
Courts have been divided over the ability of localities to reg-
ulate cable charges other than for programming. One court has 
held that disconnect fees can be regulated.32 Another court held 
that fees for FM service, second cable outlets, and remote control 
26 /d. at § 626(c)(I)(B), 47 U.S.C. § 546 (c)(I)(B). The Cable Act uses the term 
"cable services" to mean programming. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. 
27 Cable Act, § 624,47 U.S.C. § 545 (prohibiting franchise requirements for specific 
"video programming or other information services"). 
28 Id. at § 623(a).(b), 47 U.S.C. § 543(a),(b) (permitting deregulation if a cable sys-
tem faces "effective competition"). 
29 Id. at § 602(5), § 522(5). See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. 
30 Housatonic Cable Vision. Co. v. Department of Pub. Uti I. Control, 622 F. Supp. 
798 (D. Conn. 1985). 
31 Id. at 811. 
32 Comcast Cablevision of Sterling Heights, Inc. v. City of Sterling Heights, 178 
Mich. App. 117, 443 N.W. 2d 440 (1989). 
1990] LEGISLATIVE DRAITING AND THE CABLE ACT 239 
devices are "rates" and thus protected from local regulation. 33 
. Other questions arise. For example, in the Cable Act, there 
is no. discussion of whether a city can regulate the rates for the 
provision of "lock boxes," devices that permit individual sub-
scribers to block out offensive programming.34 Lock boxes playa 
critical role in the regulation of cable television. They permit in-
dividual households to keep indecent programming off their sets, 
without censorship and without preventing the viewing by those 
who wish to see such programming.35 It would be a legitimate 
policy decision for a locality to decide that the costs of protecting 
the sensitive, without harming the willing, viewer should be 
shared by the entire community, not just those desiring the pro-
tection. This would be the economic effect of providing lock 
boxes at no charge to all who request them. 36 Cities should be 
permitted either to require the free distribution of lock boxes or 
to regulate the price at which they are made available. 
A revision of the Cable Act should specify that such regula-
tion is permitted. For localities where rates have been deregu-
lated, a logical distinction should be drawn into the legislation, 
. one based on the premise that" only "effective competition" pre-
cludes the heed for regulation. Under traditional economic anal-
ysis, consumers in a competitive market will choose to purchase 
cable service if they value the additional programming they can 
receive at more than the monthly price they must pay.37 Cable 
companies, according to this theory, will not charge exorbitant 
prices when there are easy alternatives, and video and radio serv-
ices should be deregulated in competitive markets. There is no 
reason to believe, though, that secondary charges will be simi-
larly controlled by market forces. Disconnect fees, for example, 
will not figure in a consumer's initial purchasing decision.38 Fur-
thermore, as stated earlier, there may be policy reasons to price 
lock boxes at below market prices. The revised Cable Act, if it 
continues rate deregulation, should describe explicitly what 
33 City of Dubuque v. Group W Cable, C 85-1046 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 25, 1987), reported 
in KAGAN, CABLE TV L. RPTR., Mar. 11, 1987, at 5. See Rosenthal v. Sammons Communi-
cations, W85-0214(B) (S.D. Miss. May 8, 1986), reported in KAGAN, CABLE TV L. RPTR., 
June 13, 1987, at 8 (preemption of charges for wiring second television sets). 
34 See Cable Act, § 624(d)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2). 
35 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 70. 
36 The Cable Act only requires that the operator provide lock boxes to those who 
request them. There is no requirement that they be affordable. Cable Act, § 624(d)(2), 
47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2). 
37 See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 3-10 (2d ed. 1977). 
38 This analysis is similar to why many courts do not enforce secondary clauses in 
consumer form contracts. See generally E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 293-302 (1982). 
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"rates" are deregulated and specify that the preemption of regu-
lating "rates for the provision of cable service"39 only includes 
video and other programming, plus the technology necessary for 
the general reception of that programming. Thus, the converters 
used by all subscribers would' be free from regulation, but other 
charges not affected by "effective competition," such as lock 
boxes, disconnect fees, or late fees, would be subject to city 
reVIew., 
Other local regulation involving rates may further the effec-
tiveness of the "competitive" market. A requirement that rea-
sonable notice be given prior to a rate increase taking effect 
would permit subscribers to make alternate arrangements for the 
reception of video programming without paying the unbar-
gained-for increase.4o Franchising authorities should be author-
ized by the revised Cable Act to impose such advance notice 
requirements. 
Imprecise drafting has also permitted the FCC and various 
courts to limit the ability of individuals to receive cable, even 
when they are willing to pay the offered rate~ Thus, despite rela-
tively clear congressional intent, provisions that require cable op-
erators to wire all parts of a' community 'and that require 
landlords to permit cable operators to offer service to tenants 
have been unduly restricted. ' 
The House Report states that the Cable Act, "[r]equires that 
cable service be made available in all areas of a city .... "41 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, though, de-
clared that the Act, "manifestly does not require universal ser-
vice. "42 The section of the 1984 Act in question states that "[i]n 
awarding a franchise or franchises, a franchising authority shall 
assure that access to cable service is not denied to any group of 
potential residential cable subscribers because of the income of 
the local area in which such group resides. "43 
To determine the meaning of this language, the court 
quoted from the House Report, which stated that "a franchising 
authority in the franchisIng process shall require the wiring of all 
areas of the franchise area to avoid this kind of practice [redlin-
39 Cable Act, § 623(a), 47 U.S.C. § 543(a). 
40 One court has upheld a 90-day notice requirement. Comcast Cablevision of Ster-
ling Heights, Inc. v. City of Sterling Heights, 178 Mich. App. 117, 443 N. W .2d. 440 
(1989). 
41 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 20. 
42 ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1580 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 959 
(1988). ' 
43 Cable Act, § 621 (a)(3) , 47 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(3). 
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ing]."44 The court stated, "[W]e read the sentence to require ex-
actly what it says: 'wiring of all areas of the franchise' to prevent 
redlining."45 Therefore, the court concluded that if there was no 
proof of redlining, wiring of a community could be limited. In 
quoting the House Report, the court omitted the key introduc-
tory phrase indicating that the franchising authorities were re-
quired to act "in awarding a franchise or franchises,"46 in other 
words in the franchising process itself. Thus, franchising author-
ities were required to "assure ... access"47 before there could be 
any evidence of redlining. The obvious course of action was to 
require universal service in the franchise process. 
Moreover, the concept of universal service permeates the 
regulation of electronic communication. In its allocation of tele-
vision frequencies, the FCC has long had as its top priority the 
provision of television service to every part of the country.48 
Similarly, the FCC is statutorily required to protect, "the princi-
ple of universal telephone service, accessible to all segments of 
the population regardless of income."49 
The Cable Act should be clarified so that the principle of 
universal service unmistakably applies to cable television as well. 
All areas of a community should be wired and operators should 
be barred from using facially neutral reasons to avoid low income 
neighborhoods. The only exception should be those areas that 
the franchising authority and operator agree are too remote for 
economic wiring. 50 
Consumers are also denied the opportunity to subscribe to 
cable television if they are not home owners but merely tenants. 
Many landlords sign an exclusive contract with a Satellite Master 
Antennae System ("SMA TV") and preclude the cable operator 
from contracting with willing potential subscribers.51 An earlier 
draft of the Cable Act explicitly addressed this situation by re-
44 ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d at 1580. 
45 Id. (emphasis in original)(quoting HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 59). 
46 /d. at 1579 (quoting HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 59) (omitted id. at 1580). 
47 /d. at 1560. 
48 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (making broadcasting available "to all the people of the 
United States"). 
49 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057, 1120 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 
464 U.S. 1013 (1983) .. 
50 This was a statement made in a colloquy on the 1984 Act by prime House Spon-
sor, former Representative Wirth. 130 CONGo REC. HlO,44 1-42 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) 
(statement of Rep. Wirth). Such debates are the "least reliable" means for determining 
the proper interpretation of a statute. THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPl.lCATION OF STAT-
UTES, supra note 7, at 156. Any such exception should be specified in the statutory lan-
guage itself. 
51 See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 82. 
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quiring all owners of multi-unit residential buildings and mobile 
home parks to permit cable operators to provide service to those 
who desired it. 52 This provision was removed during the Senate-
House Conference on the bill, 53 but most of its provisions were 
incorporated in a different section of the Cable Act and can be 
read to imply that the right of tenants to receive cable is still in 
force. 
Section 621 (a)(2) permits any franchised cable operator to 
use both public rights-of-way and. "easements ... which have 
been dedicated for compatible uses. "54 The term easements in-
cludes private, as well as public, easements.55 This section, as did 
the earlier provision, provides that an operator may not adversely 
affect the safety and appearance 'of the property and must pay for 
any damages. The new section, however, omitted any reference 
to landlords and mobile home park owners as well as any discus-
sion of calculating "just compensation" for the taking. 56 To fur-
ther confuse the courts, the discussion in the House Report on 
the importance of tenant's access to cable and the Cable Act's 
intent to provide such access were retained, even after the old 
statutory section was removed.57 
Courts have been uncertain how to interpret the Cable Act's 
mixed signals. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit has concluded that the removal of this provision, in sec-
tion 633, indicates that Congress did not intend for cable opera-
tors to have any federal right of access to private, multi-unit 
dwellings. 58 Many other courts have disagreed and interpreted 
the 1984 Act to grant operators access to premises of tenants and 
condominium owners who want service. 59 
52 H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984), reprinted in HOUSE REPORT 934, 
supra note 12,.at 114. Under this provision, landlords would have been permitted to 
deny access to cable operators only if they made available "a diversity of information 
sources and services equivalent to those offered by the [local] cable system." Id. 
53 130 CONGo be. S 14,286 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater). 
54 Cable Act, § 621 (a)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 54 1 (a)(2). 
55/d. 
56 See, e.g., Loretto V. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) 
(court discusses just compensation and taking). 
57 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 36-37 and 79-83. 
58 Cable Inv., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1989). See Cable Assocs. V. 
Town and Country Management Corp., 709 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1989). One court 
has argued that the reasoning of Woolley does not restrict cable operator access to ease-
ments in private residential communities, but should be read to mean only that the 
Cable Act does not authorize operator access to the "interior of a multi-unit dwelling." 
Cable TV Fund 14-A, Ltd., V. Property Owners Ass'n, 706 F. Supp. 422, 429 (D. Md. 
1989) (emphasis in original). 
. 59 See, e.g., Centel Cable Television CO. V. Admiral's Cove Assocs., 835 F.2d 1359 
(11th Cir. 1988); Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Caravetta Enters. Inc., 682 F. 
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A redraft of the Cable Act should face this i~sue directly. No 
landlord should be able to come between a willing cable operator 
and a willing potential subscriber. As Congress stated in 1984, 
"There is simply no point in requiring diverse information 
sources and services if a large segment of the population -
apartment dwellers - can be denied access to that information 
by a landlord who, in effect, functions as an editor for his or her 
tenants. "60 As long as the property owner is given the just com-
pensation required by the Constitution,61 the tenant should re-
ceive the diversity of information services and sources promised 
by the Cable Act. 
A final issue that has bedeviled courts involves standing to 
sue to enforce the Cable Act. Only a few of the Cable Act's sub-
stantive provisions, such as those for modification, renewal, pri-
vacy and unauthorized reception of programming, specify who 
may enforce rights created by the Act.62 Many other key provi-
sions, though, are silent.63 
Courts have been forced to use the difficult test enunciated 
by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash 64 to determine if there is a 
private right of action to enforce these provisions.6!i Courts have 
split in determining whether cable operators may sue to enforce 
their section 621 right to utilize easements that are "dedicated 
for. compatible uses." The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit held that cable operators could sue to obtain 
access to the easements,66 but the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit denied standing.67 One court held that pub-
lic access programmers had standing to enforce the section 611 
ban on editorial control of access programming by a cable opera-
Supp. 1244 (D. Mass. 1985); Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enters., 633 F. Supp. 1315 
(D. Del. 1986). 
60 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 36. 
61 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
62 Cable Act, §§ 625, 626, 631, 633, and 636; 47 U.S.C. §§ 545, M6, 551, 553, and 
556. 
63 See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. 
64 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
65 The factors to be considered are: 1) Is the plaintiff a party whom Congress in-
tended to benefit especially; 2) Does the legislative enforcement scheme imply congres-
sional intent either for or against a private right of action; 3) Is private enforcement 
consistent with the statute's purpose; and 4) Does the Cable Act create an issue of fed-
erallaw? /d. at 77-78. 
66 Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral's Cove Assocs., 835.F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 
1988). Similar holdings were issued in Cable Assocs. v. Town and Country Management 
Corp., .709 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Pa. 1989) and Cable TV Fund 14-A, Ltd. v. Property 
Owners Ass'n, 706 F. Supp. 422 (D. Md. 1989). 
67 Continental Cablevision of Mich., Inc. v. Edward Rose Realty, Inc., 840 F.2d 16 
(6th Cir. 1988). See Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 680 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd 
on other grounds, 867 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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t6r,68 while a different court has ruled that viewers lack standing 
to sue to enforce the leased access provisions of the Cable Act. 69 
The Cable Act should be redrafted'to make clear that all who 
are directly injured by a violation may sue to enforce the statu-
tory protections. An over-extended city government may be in-
capable, reluctant' or uninterested in bringing litigation. Private 
enforcement is needed to permit the parties most affected by a 
violation to protect not only their own rights but the public right 
to receive cable service and 'diverse access programming. 
II. 'THE MORE THINGS CHANGE: THE IGNORED CONGRESSIONAL 
ATIEMPT TO CONTROL THE FCC 
One of the primary motivating factors for the passage of the 
Cable Act was congressional concern over the path chosen by the 
FCC. Under th~ 1934 Communications Act" the Commission's 
authority to regulate cable had emanated from its power to regu-
late broadcasting.70 Up until 1984, the Supreme Court had held 
that the FCC's power over cable was limited ~o that which was 
"reasonably ancillary" to the regulation of broadcasting.7l , The 
Court was, concerned that, because cable was not mentioned in 
the 1934 Act, a reading of the FCC's power without reference, to 
broadcasting would give the FCC "unbounded" jurisdiction.72 
OnJune 18, 1984, the Supreme Court upheld an FCC cable tele-
vision regulation. without reference to the Commission's power 
to regulate broadcasting. 73 TJIe Court held that the FCC had 
"broad respon~ibilities," and thereby broad discretion, in the 
regulation' of cable. 
Concurrently, the FCC had embarked on anaggressive cam-
paign to preempt qmch of the cable regulation at the local level. 
The Commission preempted the regulation of the rates charged 
for virtually al1c;able progrartmiing and permitted' a cable com-
pany which had contracted with a city to provide programming 
68 Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, Missouri, 723 F. Supp. 1347 
(W.D. Mo. 1989). ' 
69 New York Citizens Comm. on Cable TV v. Manhattan Cable TV, Inc., 651 y. Supp. 
802,813-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing sections 612(d), 532(d)). The court interpreted 
the phrase "any 'person aggrieved by the failure or refusal of a cable operator to make 
channel capacity available," to be limited to programmers, not, the potential viewing 
public deprived of,su!=h programming. [d. 
70 See 47 U.S'.C., § 152(a) (granting the FCC power to regulate "all interstate and 
foreign communication by wire or radio"). 
71 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). 
72 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706 (1979). . 
73 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698 (1984) (upholding preemp-
tion of all state regulation of the "signals, carried by cable system operators"). 
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. . . . ~ . 
on the basic tier to retier such programming unllaterally.74 An-
other decision restricted the ability of cities to enforce commit-
ment for the funding of public access faciiities. 75 . 
Many in Congress were alarmed at the unrestra~ned power 
oEthe FCC. In the words oEone legislator, "We must not' abdi-
cate our responsibility and turn cable regulation over to the FCC 
and the -Supreme C04rt."76 Significantly, even among those who 
favored deregulation for cable television, the FCC was appar-
ently nof held in high regard. 77 There is not a single word of 
praise for the FCC in either the House Report or the floor debate 
on the Cable Act. . 
Accordingly, the Cable Act explicitly limited the role and dis-
cretion of the FCC in matters of cable policy. Most notably, sec-
tion 3 of the Cable Act constricts the source of FCC authority: 
"The provisions of this Act [the Communications Act of 1934] 
shall apply with respect to cable service ... as provided in title VI 
[entitled 'Cable Communications ']. "78 Thus, the FCC was de-
nied the ability to use its open-ended "public interest" grant of 
authority over broadcasting,79 but was limited to those duties 
specified 'in the Cable Act. . . '. . . 
However, the FCC, continues to assert its former reg\llatory 
power. In preempting local regulation of the technical standards 
to be met bya cable operator, the FCC relied· not only on the 
specific Cabl~ Act prov~sion on technical standards but on its pre-
Act broad, amorphous power, "to r~gulate all aspects of inter-
state communication by wire or radio," and take "all regulatory 
actions 'necessary to ensure the achievement of the Commis~ 
sian's statutory responsibilities.' "80 
Though the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's preemption of 
technical standard regulation, the Court expressly declined to 
decide' whether the FCC continues to possess its~ pre~Act regula-
tory power.8) In so declining, the Court included a long footnote 
. t 
74 See Community Cable TV, Inc., 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 735 (1984), affg: 54 Rad. 
Reg. 2d (P&F) 1351 (1983). Fora further discussion of related issues, see gene'rally Cox 
Cable of New Orleans, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 594 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. La. 1984), 
vacated. without opinion, (E.D. La. Dec. 16, 1985). I • 
75 City of Miami, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 458 (1984). . 
76 130 CoNG.REC. HIO,444 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. Markey). 
77 Even where the House Report endorsed federal preemption over certain areas, 
disapproval of the FCC was apparent: "[Franchising authority] mll~t be based on certain 
important. uniform Federal standards that are not continually altered by Federal, state or 
local regulation." HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 24 (emphasis added). 
78 47. U.S.C. § 3 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
79 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
80 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984). 
81 City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 70 n.6 (1988). 
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presenting both sides' arguments as to the reach of the FCC's 
power. First, the Court discussed the new language of section 3 
that specifies that the FCC's power over cable is provided in the 
Cable Act. 82 Then the Court presented the following reason 
why, arguably, the FCC's power was undiminished: "On the 
other hand, the House Report suggests that this language is 
merely a more explicit grant of "exclusive jurisdiction" to the 
Commission over specified aspects of cable service, see H.R.Rep. 
No. 98-934, at 95-96 (1984), which settles matters that had occa-
sionally been in dispute."83 
The citation to the House Report is curious, since the actual 
language does not seem to support a finding of broad FCC 
power over cable television. The complete language from the 
House Report quote states that the FCC's "exclusive jurisdic-
tion" over cable is only "as provided in Title VI."84 It does not 
imply that there is any other source of "exclusive jurisdiction" 
over cable for the FCC. Moreover, on the cited page 96, the 
House Report states that, "the addition of a new Title VI of the 
Communications Act [the Cable Act], regarding c~ble services, 
does not limit any jurisdiction the FCC may otherwise have over 
other communications services provided over a cable system."85 
Certainly, if Congress went out of its way to declare that the 
Cable Act was not intended to limit FCC jurisdiction over "other 
communications services provided over a cable system," it 
strongly implies that the Cable Act does limit FCC jurisdiction 
over cable services provided over a cable system. 
A revision of the Cable Act should avoid the litigation that 
will inevitably follow the Supreme Court's discussion, without 
resolution, of this issue. New language should clarify Congress' 
desire to rein in the FCC. The scope of the FCC's power would 
be clearly, if redundantly, indicated by adding the word "only," 
so that section 152(a) read, "The provision of this Act shall apply 
with respect to cable service ... only as provided in title VI." 
Also troubling is the manner in which the FCC continues to 
regulate as if the Congress had not altered its permissible regula-
82 [d. 
83 [d. The Court also stated that section 303 of the Communications Act "continues 
to give the Commission broad rulemaking power 'as may be necessary to carry out the 
provisions of this chapter,' 47 U.S.C. § 303(r), which includes the body of the Cable Act 
as one of its subchapters." /d. This reference to the unamended section 303(r) is unper-
suasive as the Cable Act'sjurisdictional provision could be easily interpreted as a specific 
limitation on the broader power. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING, supra note 10, at 101 
(discussing implied amendment by inconsistent legislative action). 
84 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 95. 
85 [d. at 96 (emphasis added). 
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tory (or more precisely, deregulatory) goals. The FCC demon-
strated its stubborn refusal to accede to congressional dictates. 
when it described the congressional purposes behind the Cable 
Act as to "significantly deregulate the provision of cable ser-
vice."86 This alleged single-minded congressional intent was dis-
covered by the FCC through a combination of wishful thinking 
and of carefully editing out all statements contrary to the Com-
mission's "deregulation mania."87 The Commission stated that: 
Foremost among these [congressional purposes] is the intent 
of the statute to establish "standards which encourage the 
growth and development of cable systems[,] . . . assure that 
cable communications provide ... the widest possible diversity 
of information sources and services to the public[,] ... " and 
"[p]romote competition in cable communications and mini-
mize unnecessary regulation that wOl,lld impose an undue eco-
nomic burden on cable systems. "88 
The complete statutory language, which the Commission only 
partially quoted, reveals not a mandate for deregulation but an un-
mistakable congressional intent to balance the interests of both the 
regulators and the regulated. The full language, with the words 
omitted by the FCC italicized, expressed an intent to provide 
franchising "standards which encourage the growth and develop-
ment of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive to 
the needs and interests of the local community";89 and "assure that cable 
communications provide and are encouraged to provide the widest pos-
sible diversity of information sources and services to the public. "90 
Perhaps it is clearer in hindsight, but the FCC should not have 
been trusted to abandon its previous deregulatory goals and follow 
the more complex mandate of the Cable Act. The result of what 
one observer has termed the "unforseen actions" of the FCC,91 has 
been a deregulation of cable rates in more than 97% of the nation's 
cable systems,92 and the FCC's preemption of local requirements 
for technical standards that exceed the minimum imposed by the 
86 Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 
1984,50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,650 n.69 (1985). 
87 130 CONGo REC. HIO,444 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) (statement of Rep. Markey). 
88 Implementing the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 49 
Fed. Reg. 48,765, 48,765-48,766 (1984). 
89 Cable Act, § 601(2), (4),47 U.S.C. § 521(2), (4) (emphasis added). 
90 [d. 
91 Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 6, at 187 (statement of Mayor Sharpe James of 
Newark, NJ.). 
92 U.S. General Accounting Office, National Suroey of Cable Television Rates and Seroices 4 
(1989). 
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FCC during 1974.93 
In the future, the FCC should be denied discretion to deter-
mine the scope of appropriate preemption and deregulation. Con-
gress, not the FCC, should define "effective competition" for rate 
regulation and should permit local governments to supplement the 
technical and quality standards that cable systems must meet. . 
III. To DRAFT CABLE LEGISLATION, CONGRESS MUST LISTEN TO 
"THE WIDEST POSSIBLE DIVERSIlY OF INFORMATION' 
SOURCES"94 
The process by which the Cable Act was drafted guaranteed 
a future of unending difficulty. Behind closed doors, two players, 
the cities and the cable industry, hammered out a proposal that 
both believed would protect their interests. Their agreement be-
came the basis for the Cable Act.95 Delegating the initial drafting 
of the legislation to these two interested parties was probably es-
sential in the political environment of the early 1980's if there 
was to be any chance for enacting comprehensive legislation. 
Unfortunately, the self-interests of these two groups did not in-
clude the interests of the rest of the universe affected by the leg-
islation. More insidiously, there were certain issues for which the 
negotiators were not adversaries but shared an interest, an inter-
est at odds with that of the subscribing public. Obviously, any 
revision of the Cable Act must take into account the views of all 
those affected by the legislation.96 
Although the representatives of city government and cable 
operators fought over the role that the cities should have in regu-
lating cable, they shared a desire to preclude others from having 
a significant role. To the operators, this would permit fewer par-
ties to regulate; for the cities, it meant fewer limitations of their 
discretion. Thus, the original draft of the Cable Act which was 
agreed to by the cities and cable industry denied the public any 
93 Report and Order in MM Docket No. 85-38, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,462 (1985), maintain-
ing standards established in Report and Order in Docket No. 20,018, 49 F.C.C.2d 470, 477-
80 (1974). The 1985 preemption was upheld in City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 
(1988). 
94 Cable Act, § 601(4), 47 U.S.C. § 521(4). 
95 See, e.g., 130 CONGo REc. S14,283 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1984) (statement of Sen. 
Goldwater) (describing negotiations between the cities and cable industry as basis for 
cable legislation). 
96 Congress seems to have learned this lesson. Among the speakers at congressional 
hearings on cable legislation, aside froin the cities and the cable industry, are represent-
atives from broadcasters, wireless cable operators, the telephone industry, public access 
programmers and consumer groups. See Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 6, at III. 
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role in the renewal process.97 The proceedings were to be only 
for the benefit of the local government and the incumbent opera-
tor. It took a last minute amendment to provide that the public 
be granted "appropriate notice" and "opportunity for comment" 
o'n either an informal granting of renewal or during a hearing on 
the cable company's performance under the franchise.98 
This limited grant of participation neither specifies the role 
to be played by the public nor provides the public with an ade-
quate role in' the renewal decision: The Cable Act should be 
amended to permit the public tQ stop "sweetheart deals" for re-
newal between franchising authorities and cable operators.99 
The public should be permitted to require a public hearing on 
the adequacy of the cable operator's performance under the ex-
isting franchise and request proposals for the renewed franchise. 
This right could be enforceable either through individual request 
or through the obtaining of signatures of a certain percentage of 
the population. Second, any city granting renewal should be re-
quired to announce, in writing, the reasons for its decision. Fi-
nally, subscribers should be permitted to appeal any granting ofa 
renewal if either proper procedures are not followed or the city's 
published factual conclusions are "clearly erroneous" in light of 
the information obtained at the hearing. 
, A second area where the cities and cable industry lacked in-
centive to protect the public interest involves access to the cable 
system for non-affiliated programmers. The Cable Act contains 
provisions regarding both, "public access," the cablecasting of 
programs at little, or no cost to the g~neral public, and "leased 
ac'cess,"100 the leasing of channel time for commercial distribu-
tion of programming. Due to the failures of the Cable Act, public 
access, h4s been unnecessarily hindered and leased access has 
been a total, undeniable failure: 
'Third-party access to the cable system was a critical part of 
the balance struck by the Cable Act. In fact, one of the stated 
purposes of the Cable Act was to "assure that cable communica-
97 See H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 626, reprinted in HOUSE REPORT 934, supra 
note 12, 'at 110. ' 
98 Cable Act, § 626 (a), (h), 47 U.S.C. § 546(a}, (h). This amendment was added on 
the last day of congressional debate. 130 CONGo REC. SI4,281 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1984) 
(amendment of Sen. Goldwater). 
99 This is not necessarily a frivolous fear. Virtually all franchises are renewed, with 
only a few notable'ex~eptions. In 1984, it was reported that operators in New Vorl<. State 
had been awarded renewal in all 370 of their attempts. Narrod, State Regulators See More 
Work with Passage of New Cable Law, Multichannel News, Dec. 3, 1984, al: 33, col. l. 
100 The Cable i\ct refers to "leased access" as "commercial use." Cable Act, § 612, 
47 U.S.C. § 532. 
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tions provide ... the widest possible diversity of information sources 
and services to the public."lol The theory behind public access is 
that the cable operator, the single electronic gatekeeper in a 
community, should not monopolize the entire multi-channel ca-
pacity of a system constructed on the public rights-of-way. In 
lieu of monopolization, "[public access channels] provide groups 
and individuals who generally have not had access to the elec-
tronic media with the opportunity to become sources of informa-
tion in the electronic marketplace of ideas."lo2 Accordingly, the 
Act permits franchising authorities to require that channels be set 
aside for public access and that cable operators provide funding, 
staffing, and hardware for the production of access program-
ming, and prohibits the cable operator from exerting any edito-
rial control over the access programming. \03 The operator is 
permitted to present its own programming on unused access 
channels. \04 
Under the current legislative scheme, access use has grown. 
More than 1,200 cable systems run access programming and ap-
proximately 10,000 hours of access programming are produced 
each week. \05 The development of access has been hampered, 
though, by the failure of the Cable Act to protect it from assault, 
hostility and neglect by certain members of both the cable indus-
try and city government. 
Almost 8,000 cable systems do not provide access for mem-
bers of their community. In some communities this is due to the 
limited capacity of outdated 12-channel systems, \06 but else-
where the absence is due to lack of local governmental initiative. 
Because the concept of access programming is still relatively 
new, there is not a constituency demanding access in every town. 
The revised Cable Act should permit all Americans to communi-
cate electronically with their neighbors. Every cable system that 
uses public rights-of-way. should be required to provide access 
for members' of the local community. If that access is not used, 
the "fallow time" provisions will permit the operator to present 
programming. But that choice should only be made after the 
101 /d. at § 601(4), 47 U.S.C. § 521(4) (emphasis added). 
\02 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 30. 
103 Cable Act, § 611(a), (b): and (e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(a), (b), and (e). 
\04 [d. at § 6l1(d), § 531(d). This is known as the "fallow time" provision. 
105 Kierman, To Watch is O.K., BtU to Air is Divine, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 
16, 1989, at 112. 
\06 Since more than half of the nation's approximately 9,000 cable systems have at 
least 30 channels, this excuse is no longer the primary source of the problem. Oversight 
of Cable TV, supra note 6, at 339 (statement of FCC Chairman Alfred C. Sikes). 
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community has had the opportunity to learn of and experience 
"the video equivalent of the speaker's soap box or the electronic 
parallel to the printed leaflet." 107 
To flourish, access must be adequately funded and available 
for all to view. Most of the "funding" for access comes from the 
sweat equity of the volunteer, but a minimum of equipment and 
services for community use is needed to permit individuals and 
small groups to learn how to produce access progTamming. In 
times of budget crunches, money raised from the franchise fee 
will be used for police forces and potholes, not access.108 In 
many communities, access will be crippled if local g'overnment is 
forced to make such a choice. 
Cities should not be put in the situation of making this pain-
ful choice. Unlike franchise fees that represent "rent" for use of 
city streets,109 money for access represents a legitimate, directly 
relevant, regulatory purpose - ensuring that the cable system 
that occupies the public property is available for communication 
by the public. IIO Accordingly, the revised Cable Act should pro-
vide that money for access not be deducted from the franchise 
fee ceiling. 
Access uniquely permits electronic communication by "poor 
and wealthy alike," and reduces concern of "domination of the 
media by the wealthy." III Yet access programming cannot reach 
those who cannot afford the unregulated rates of the cable opera-
tor. There can be no "effective competition" for public access 
when no other forum for electronic communication is available. 
Therefore, communities should be permitted to regulate the 
rates charged for the least expensive tier containing access chan-
nels. This lifeline rate will permit a community to create an elec-
tronic village instead of an information underclass. 
Finally, an important silence in the Cable Act should be ad-
dressed. Many public access centers are run neither by City Hall 
107 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note·12,·at 30. The House Report noted that access can, 
"also contribute to an informed citizenry by bringing local schools into the home, and 
by showing the public local government at work." /d. 
108 The Cable Act limits franchise fees to 5% of gross revenue per 12 month period. 
Cable Act, § 622(b), 47 U.S.C. § 542(b). 
109 See, e.g., Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 
1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1988). 
I 10 This is analogous to the requirement that newspapers pay a lict:nse fee for the 
right to place news racks in a public train station. The court, in upholding this fee, 
stressed that it was not a tax for filling the general coffers, but was to be used to provide 
economical commuter transportation, in other words a directly related regulatory pur-
pose. Gannet Satellite Information Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745 
F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984). 
III HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 36. 
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nor the cable operator, but by independent non-profit organiza-
tions.112 Access corporations, though not mentioned in the 
Cable Act, are increasingly being used to run access channels. I 13 
They facilitate the creation of broad community programming 
without undue political and economic pressure. The Cable Act 
provides that cable operators who do not edit or produce access 
programming will not be liable for its content. 114 This makes 
good sense; only the programmer who produces the program 
should be responsible for its legal consequences. 115 The statu-
tory language should be clarified so that the protection from lia-
bility extends to any entity be it city, independent access 
organization or some alternate form of management that oper-
ates the access channel, yet is forbidden to exercise editorial 
control. 116 
Leased access has not been as fortunate as public access. 
The inadequacies of the Cable Act have not simply hindered, but 
have smothered, the ability of non-affiliated programmers to 
reach the public through a system of leased access. 117 Although 
the Cable Act requires that cable operators with more than thirty-
six channels provide leased access at prices, terms and conditions 
that are "reasonable," I 18 a reviewing court may not consider the 
arrangement between a cable operator and its affiliate program-
mers in determining what is "Jeasonable."119 Thus, cable opera-
112 See, e.g., Taylor & Brand, Access: The Community Connection, reprinted in CABLE TV 
RENEWALS & REFRANCHISING 82 O. Rice, ed. 1983) (describing an Access Management 
Corporation as one, "set up by city ordinance to handle access. It is granted a portion of 
the franchise fee, and its operation and relationship with both the city and the cable 
operator is established by city ordinance."). Numerous cities including Boston, Massa-
chusetts, Cincinnati, Ohio, and Austin, Texas have such independent entities running 
access. . 
113 See, e.g., FOUNDATION FOR COMMUNITY SERVICE CABLE TELEVISION, COMMUNITY 
CHANNELS, FREE SPEECH & THE LAw II (1988). 
114 Cable Act, § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558. 
115 See, e.g., Cable Act, § 637, 47 U.S.C. § 557 (two years imprisol)ment and $10,000' 
fine for anyone cablecasting obscene programming). 
I 16 While a legal argument can be made that such protection is available through 
either the Cable Act or the Constitution, the cloud of uncertainty that pervades this area 
should be removed. See Meyerson, The Right to Speak, The Right to Hear, and the Right Not 
to Hear: The Technological Resolution to the Cable/ Pornography Debate, 21 U. MICH.]. L. REF. 
137 (1988). See also Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 6, at 323 (statement of Sharon Ingra-
ham, National Federation of Cable Programmers) (resident of Cincinnati, Ohio sues 
both city and access center over the content of access programming, though neither 
entity was permitted to exert editorial control). 
I 17 One of the very few instances of use of leased access was in Pu'erto Rico, where a 
cable company agreed to carry a former programmer, the Playboy Channel, as a "com-
mercial use" channel, to avoid pro'secution for "obscenity." Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Pub-
lic Servo Comm'n of Puerto Rico, 698 F. Supp. 401 (D.P.R. 1988). 
118 Cable Act, § 612(c), (d), 47 U.S.C. § 532(c), (d). See generally Oversight of Cable TV, 
supra note 6, at 395-97 (statement of Preston R. Padden). 
119 Cable Act, § 611(d), 47 U.S.C. § 531(d). 
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tors have been permitted to favor their own programmers at the 
expense of the unaffiliated programmers. 
The theory behind leased access voiced in 1984 is still valid: 
Third-party commercial access complements [public] ac-
cess by assuring that sufficient channels are available for com-
mercial program suppliers with program services which 
compete with existing cable offerings, 'or which are otherwise 
not offered by the cable operator (for political reasons, for 
instance) .... 
. . . A requirement that channels be set aside for third-
party commercial access separates editorial control over a lim-
ited number of cable channels from the ownership of the cable 
system itself. Such a requirement is fundamental to the goal of provid-
ing subscribers with the diversity of information sources intended by the 
First Amendment. 120 
To make this "fundamental" requirement meaningful, several 
changes must be implemented in the commercial use section. First, 
unaffiliated programmers must be entitled to access to a cable sys-
tem at rates, terms and conditions that are at least a.s favorable as 
those provided to affiliated programming services. Second, there 
must be a quick and inexpensive means for a programmer to learn 
what rates will be charged. Thus, either franchising authorities or 
state Public Service Commissions should be permiw::d to establish 
rates, terms, and conditions for commercial access. Finally, the FCC 
has stated that a cable system that has not been "deliberately con-
figured" to technically preclude commercial access is not required 
to share its hardware and facilities, even if they are necessary for the 
operation of commercial access. 121 The Cable Act should be revised 
so that cable operators have an affirmative duty to share all facilities 
and services that are necessary for the growth and viability of leased 
access. 
Because the Cable Act was primarily negotiated by cities and 
cable operators, another issue that received virtually no attention 
was channel positioning. The Cable Act permitted cable operators 
to determine the channel position for the programming it of-
fered. 122 The theory was that, as at least a partial first amendment 
120 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 30-31 (emphasis added). 
121 Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 
1984, 18,637, 18,642 (1985). The FCC made this statement despite being currently 
barred from rulemaking in the area of commercial access. Cable Act, § 612(g), 47 
U.S.C. § 532(g). 
122 Cable Act, § 624(g), 47 U.S.C. § 544(g). 
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speaker that selected programming services, cable operators should 
be free to determine where these services would be displayed. 
The deficiency in this reasoning is that the unrestrained power 
to determine channel position has trampled first amendment rights 
of other speakers, namely local broadcasters and public access pro-
grammers. Broadcast stations and access channels have been 
moved away from the channel locations where they were known to 
viewers and to high-number positions with inferior reception. 123 
Significantly, giving the power to reposition access channels to a 
cable operator does not further first amendment principles because 
cable operators are not "speakers" for access channels but merely 
serve as "conduits."124 In other words, access channels are not 
within operators' editorial interest and operators should not be per-
mitted to obstruct the development of an audience for access 
programming. 
With the demise of the must-carry rules,125 cable operators 
have had the freedom to select which broadcasters to carry. Even 
without new must-carry rules, though, random repositioning by 
cable operators harms the public interest. There is, without ques-
tion, a public benefit from free, over-the-air television. Television 
stations generally invest great sums of money to acquaint the public 
with their channel numbers. Historically, some cable systems have 
positioned broadcasters on channels different from their FCC-as-
signed number and the stations have been forced to advertise both 
numbers. In either case, it will obviously injure broadcasters to pay 
the enormous added expense of reeducating the public to a new 
channel position. If there is more than one cable system carrying a 
local broadcast station, each can put the station at a different chan-
nel position, further harming the ability of that broadcaster to com-
municate with its audience. Random repositioning poses an 
obvious threat to the well-being of local broadcasters, especially 
smaller UHF stations. If local broadcast channels are, even to a 
small extent competitors with cable television,126 it makes no sense 
to put the power to hinder the effectiveness of the broadcasters in 
the hands of their competitor. 127 
123 See, e.g., Oversight of Cable TV, supra note 6, at 381-96 (statement of Preston R. 
Padden). 
124 HOUSE REPORT 934, supra note 12, at 35. 
125 See Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). 
126 Or, in the view of the FCC, "effective competition" for cable operators.lmplementa-
tion of the Provisions, 50 Fed. Reg. at 18,648-18,651. 
127 See, e.g., Ziegler, United Cable Eyes Plan to Bump Network Ajjils to Upper Channels; TCI 
Unit Will Cluster Independents, Multichannel News, Nov. 3, 1986, at I, cols. 1-3. 
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The Cable Act should be revised to deny cable operators such 
power. The position of access channels should be set by the 
franchising authority. The channel position of local broadcasters 
should be, where possible, that set by the numbering selected by the 
FCC, except that when a broadcaster has had a different position on 
a cable system for a significant period of time, the broadcaster 
should have the choice of staying at that number or moving to the 
one assigned by the FCC. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When Congress drafted the Cable Act in 1984, it was not 
writing on a blank slate, but over a confusing hodgepodge of 
contradictory policies and conflicting jurisdictions. In revising 
the Cable Act, Congress will have an easier task, since the frame-
work is already in place and because experience under the Cable 
Act has so blatantly revealed its weaknesses. 
Care must nonetheless be taken to avoid repeating the er-
rors of the past. All voices must be heard in the debate on revi-
sion. The public interest cannot be served if only the most 
powerful interests are considered. Second, the sources of power 
must· be more carefully delineated. A Federal Communications 
Commission bent on deregulation can prevent localities from 
performing the tasks assigned them by Congress. The preemp-
tion powe.rs of the FCC over cable must be precisely detailed. 
Finally, the confusing world of cable legislation does not 
need the further confusion of imprecise language. Not only must 
policy considerations be carefully considered, but the language 
chosen to express policy determinations must be painstakingly 
evaluated. Key words and phrases must be defined so that their 
meaning will be understood. In creating a new legal universe to 
ensure efficient cable communications, Congress must ensure 
that the new legal rules are efficiently communicated as well. In 
drafting a revised Cable Act, "[t]he draftsman's job is to avoid 
legal uncertainty, not to create it."128 
128 LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING, supra note 10, at 29. 
